The proliferation of smart devices in recent years has led to novel smart home applications that upgrade traditional home appliances to intelligent units and automatically adapt their services without human assistance. In a smart home system, a central gateway is required to coordinate the functions of various smart home devices and allow bidirectional communications. However, the gateway may cause leakage of sensitive information unless proper privacy protections are applied. In this work, we first introduce a smart home model based on fog computing and secured by differential privacy. Then, we apply a personalized differential privacy scheme to provide privacy protection. Furthermore, we consider a collusion attack and propose our differential privacy model called APDP based on a modified Laplace mechanism and a Markov process to strengthen privacy protection, thus resisting the attack. Lastly, we perform extensive experiments based on the real-world datasets to evaluate the proposed APDP model.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the fast development of computing, communication and data science technologies, advanced service systems, such as the smart home, make our life more efficient and convenient. The smart home is regarded as an instance of the Internet of Things (IoT) [1] that transforms a dwelling into an intelligent system incorporating communication networks. As a result, key electrical appliances and services can be remotely accessed, monitored and even controlled, leading to the emergence of many appealing applications, e.g., caring for senior citizens and patients, automated alarms, and water and electricity self-service [2] , [3] .
To develop a service, it is necessary to enhance the processing and storage ability of a smart home system. An increasing amount of data from various appliances must to be collected in real time, stored, encrypted, transmitted, processed, and fed back. However, due to limited resources, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Wei Quan. the traditional gateway device of a smart home can hardly satisfy the requirements of complicated big data processing tasks, massive historical resource storage, and real-time processing with feedback. Although the above requirements can be partially solved by cloud computing, this approach leads to the emergence of new challenges, such as latency and transmission bandwidth [4] , [5] . The newly emerged fog computing, regarded as an extension of cloud computing to support mobile applications at the network edge [6] , is a promising solution to the above challenges. We propose a fog-based gateway for a smart home and name it the fog server. As shown in Fig. 1 , the fog server is a lightweight cloud-like device with an onboard CPU, a large storage capacity, and wireless communication interfaces. The fog server running on such a device provides distributed computation, communication, control and storage to the smart home along with the cloud-to-things continuum [7] - [9] .
Privacy issues have become increasingly challenging in smart home systems [10] . Specifically, the data collected from the IoT devices contain sensitive personal VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ information. Massive volumes of data collected from ubiquitous sensors, wearable devices or smart meters may lead to improper release of sensitive personal and private information. We identify two primary challenges in smart home privacy protection. The first is the lack of personalized privacy protection. The second is vulnerability to collusion attacks from both insider nodes and outsider clouds [11] , [12] . These two challenges significantly degrade the utility of systems and expose them to significant threats. Several existing studies have provided privacy protection uniformly. The clustering-based methods include K-anonymity [13] , L-diversity [14] , T-closeness [15] and their variants [16] . Clustering-based methods provide satisfactory protection in the scenario of datasets with records that share the same attributes; however, they do not function well in the scenario of data diffusion. Dwork proposed differential privacy that offers privacy protection with a solid theoretical foundation [17] . Under the framework of differential privacy, numerous mechanisms have been proposed to achieve privacy preservation, e.g., Laplace noise [18] and sampling [19] . Although differential privacy can offer strict protection, most existing approaches use fixed privacy levels to cope with various requirements [20] . Recent privacy studies on smart homes also include the communication protocol [21] , data analytics in cloud-based smart homes [22] , location sharing [23] , etc.
With significantly increased computing resources, a fog computing-based smart home not only provides enhanced smart home applications but also introduces more dimensions of privacy preservation into smart home systems. In this paper, we develop a personalized differential privacy protection scheme. We first develop a smart home model based on fog computing and protected by differential privacy. We further introduce a personalized differential privacy mechanism based on trust distance and a Markov Laplace mechanism. We also create an enhanced differential privacy model called APDP to address the problem of a collusion attack, which is a severe problem under the multiple-cloud scenario. We perform extensive experiments to illustrate the advantage of the proposed APDP model. The primary contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
• Smart home model based on fog computing and differential privacy: We propose a privacy-preserving smart home model based on the fog computing paradigm and introduce differential privacy to protect privacy in the model. Our work is one of the first to introduce both differential privacy and fog computing to a smart home application scenario.
• Collusion attack and personalized differential privacy model: Based on the smart home model, we explore a new attack model under the personalized differential privacy protection scenario. Then, we propose our APDP model based on a modified Laplace and Markov process to improve privacy protection and resist the attack. Using formal analysis and performing an empirical study of a real-world dataset, we prove that our algorithm performs very well with respect to privacy protection, data utility, and the ability to defend against a collusion attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the related studies. Section III describes the structure of a smart home utilizing the fog computing technology and emphasizes the benefits of their interactions. Section IV presents the personalized differential privacy system model. Section V presents the adversary and collusion attack model. Section VI develops and analyzes the attack-proof mechanism. Section VII validates the proposal using simulations. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED STUDIES
The concept of a smart home has been widely explored in recent years [24] , [25] . Alam et al. [2] describe the definition of a smart home as ''an application of ubiquitous or pervasive computing or environment'' and analyze the development of smart homes. Stojkoska and Trivodaliev [10] present a holistic approach to the integration of state-of-the-art IoT solutions into smart homes. Chan et al. [26] present an international selection of leading smart home projects, as well as the associated technologies of wearable or implantable monitoring systems and assistive robotics. Datta et al. [27] develop an IoT architecture that enables smarter, connected and personalized healthcare and wellness services for residents of smart homes. Cicirelli et al. [28] propose a framework that primarily relies on the cloud-assisted agent-based smart home environment architecture, offering basic abstraction entities for design and implementation. Jie et al. [1] describe the integration of IoT technologies into smart home systems.
Fog computing has many advantages in terms of privacy protection and performance in a smart home.
Dastjerdi and Buyya [29] introduce fog computing components, software systems and applications. Luan et al. [30] provide an overview of fog computing from the networking perspective to improve the efficiency aspects of fog computing. Chiang and Zhang [7] describe the range of new challenges in the emerging IoT and the difficulty of overcoming these challenges with today's computing and networking models. Brogi and Forti [31] propose a general and extensible model to support QoS-aware deployments of IoT applications in a fog infrastructure. Tang et al. [32] present a hierarchical distributed fog computing architecture to support the integration of a very large number of infrastructure components and services into future smart cities. Datta et al. [33] discuss the architecture of fog computing that is deployed at roadside units (RSUs) and M2M gateways that offers consumer-centric IoT services. Lee et al. [34] present a gateway-based fog computing architecture for wireless sensor and actuator networks (WSANs).
Security and privacy issues in smart homes have been extensively considered by many researchers. Several existing approaches provide privacy protection uniformly. The clustering-based methods include K-anonymity [13] , L-diversity [14] , T-closeness [15] and their variants [16] . Clustering-based methods provide satisfactory protection under the scenario of datasets with records that share the same attributes; however, such methods do not work well in the data diffusion scenario. Dwork proposed differential privacy that offers privacy protection with a solid theoretical foundation [17] . Under the framework of differential privacy, numerous mechanisms have been proposed to achieve privacy preservation, e.g., Laplace noise [18] and sampling [19] . Although differential privacy can offer strict protection, most existing approaches use fixed privacy levels to cope with various requirements. Recent privacy studies of smart homes also include the communication protocol [21] , data analytics in cloud-based smart homes [22] , location sharing [23] , etc.
In this era of big data, privacy protection is required in every aspect of the system [35] , [36] . Komninos et al. [37] present dangers encountered in some of the most illustrative scenarios of interaction among entities of the smart home and smart grid environments, evaluating their impact on the entire grid. Geneiatakis et al. [38] set up the scene for a security and privacy threat analysis for a typical smart home architecture that relies on existing IoT devices and platforms that are readily available in the market. Lee et al. [39] discuss the concept of the IoT fog as well as the existing security measures useful in securing the IoT fog and then explore potential threats to the IoT fog. Yang et al. propose privacy preserving collaborative filtering via the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform [40] . Zhang et al. [41] introduce various aspects of smart city applications, discuss the system architecture, then present the general security and privacy requirements, and identify several security challenges for the smart city.
Personalized privacy can optimize the data utility while reducing the overall privacy budget [42] , [43] . For personalized privacy, Wang and Zhang [44] use a Markov decision process to control the granularity of the published data. Koufogiannis and Pappas [45] leverage personalized differential privacy to protect the privacy based on distance in social networks. Götz et al. [46] explore privately releasing user context streams for personalized mobile applications. In addition, Aghasian et al. propose a method to measure the privacy closure based on multiple social networks [47] . However, all exisiting works barely consider the personalized privacy protection in smart home scenario. In addition, personalized privacy will result in collusion attack in a certain extent, which is merely discussed either. We will try to solve these issues in the rest of this work.
III. SMART HOME MODELING BASED ON FOG COMPUTING AND DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
The objective of the smart home model is to provide high-quality services to the user while maximizing the network bandwidth and minimizing processing latency. In the proposed model, we consider a fog structure and use a fog server as the bridge between the cloud server and the IoT applications. The fog server has a certain computing capability and storage used to perform computational tasks, reducing the processing time and service latency. For clarity, we first analyze the details of the smart home architecture and then model it as a graph based on graph theory. The rationale is that we regard fog servers, cloud servers, and smart devices as nodes and the connections between them as edges.
A. FOG COMPUTING-BASED SMART HOME MODEL
To offer quality services at home, a smart home can provide many different components. In this paper, we discuss the architecture of general application with basic components. Fig. 2 demonstrates the architecture of a smart home based on fog computing, which has four layers: IoT devices, the fog server, the public cloud, and the application layer. The IoT layer in Fig. 1 includes smart devices deployed at home, such as sensors, wearable devices, smart meters, electric devices, and monitoring devices. With these smart devices, the IoT layer can obtain all of the status information in a smart home and send it to the fog simultaneously or perform post-processing at the fog server. Therefore, the IoT layer primarily performs the functions of data collection and service provision to users. The fog layer has computing, storage, control, communication, security, and privacy protection capabilities. It can process most of the data collected from the IoT and sends the analytic results to the cloud or provides direct feedback to IoT devices. When the data size is beyond the fog's processing ability, a request is sent to the cloud to participate in further processing. This fog-based structure can improve the real-time processing ability in a smart home, reduce the system latency, and save the network bandwidth. The public cloud layer has superior computing and storage capabilities that provide support to the fog. In addition, it can provide a variety of access types to the application layer, which is the top layer. Entities provide services such as medical center, alarm center, and electric utility. Building on the fog-based smart home structure, we model a smart home as a graph. We develop a personalized differential privacy protection model. It can minimize the overall privacy budget while improving data utility. In Sec. VI, we leverage a modified Laplace mechanism that introduces a noise generation process into a stochastic process and decouples the correlation among noises. As a result, we can eliminate the collusion attack under this scenario.
B. TRUST DISTANCE-BASED DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Based on the proposed smart home structure, we further model it using graph theory. We use a weighted graph
to denote the smart home based on the fog computing paradigm. In graph G, we use n ∈ N to represent each node, e ∈ E to denote the relationship between nodes, and w ∈ W to show the weights between nodes. If there are two nodes n i and n i and at least one series of edges {e ik 1 , e ik 2 , . . . , e k n j } connects them, we conclude that the nodes have a relationship.
Based on the relationship, we also use d T to describe the trust distance, where d T ∈ D T t. The application layer contains many nodes (applications), such as TVs, lighting, and cyber-physical equipment. The nodes may further connect to several sub-nodes. In this case, the nodes in the end are specific to a certain function and may leak the user's private information, e.g., the blood pressure measurement. Based on this observation, we set the trust distance D T as the number of hops between the nodes and the fog server. Therefore, the privacy level increases with the growth of trust distance D T , while decreases with the reduction of D T .
For each node n i , when fog server n F tries to diffuse its data d ij to cloud n Cj , the fog server generates a proxy of the data asŷ
where Lap( δ ) denotes the Laplace noise [18] , while δ and are the global sensitivity and privacy level, respectively. The node n i demands that the proxyŷ ij satisfy (D T )differential privacy to protect the private data. For privacy level (D T ), D T is a distance function denoting the distance between node n i and fog server n F .
For simplicity, we regard graph G as an undirected graph. However, this assumption can be eliminated, as the model works the same way for directed graphs. We also assume that the fog server is a trusted central authority and can process the data with -differential privacy and transmit the data via a secure communication channel. In the fog server, the privacy budget is a constant B that equals the sum of all privacy levels of all the published data.
IV. PERSONALIZED DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY SCHEME
We propose a personalized differential privacy-preserving data publishing model of a smart home, where the sensitive data of a certain node n i may be shared with the cloud through fog server n F . The usual data types are listed in Table 1 . The sensitive data's privacy level usually varies with and is based on the trust distance. The reason is that the contents are more private and specific if the trust distance is longer. The nodes with the longest trust distance, e.g., the wearable equipment and smart meters, possess the most private data. Moreover, the sensitive data may be released to multiple clouds if the resources of a single cloud cannot satisfy the needs. For multiple clouds, the sensitive data should be provided different levels of protection according to various requirements. In both cases, the fog server should provide personalized privacy protection to the sensitive data of node n i .
A. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy has a solid theoretical foundation for providing privacy protection to two adjacent datasets. In two adjacent datasets denoted by D and D , it is required that D have one more record than D and that an adversary cannot re-identify this specific record. 
where the probability space is taken over the randomness used by A.
B. LAPLACE MECHANISM
The Laplace mechanism is most typically used to attain -differential privacy in a numeric scenario. The key feature of this method is the generation of a random noise that follows the Laplace distribution. After the noise has been added to the raw data, an adversary cannot re-identify the location of the extra record.
The mechanism M : R n → (R n ) that adds Laplace-distributed noise N is defined by
where d Pr[N = n] is the density of Lap(b). Following the above formulation, we regard M as an -differentially private mechanism under an adjacency relation.
C. PRIVACY PROTECTION BASED ON TRUST DISTANCE
Building on the smart home model provided in Section III-B, we formulate the personalized privacy protection model based on trust distance in a fog computing structure.
In a smart home, if the computing power of the fog server is insufficient, the sensitive data of node n i may be passed to cloud server n Cj . Such data need to be protected for privacy reasons. Most existing approaches usually consider uniform privacy level protection and apply the protection once and for all. However, uniform protection cannot meet the new requirements of the smart home for various sources of data and possible multiple clouds. Therefore, we focus on providing personalized privacy protection to smart homes in this paper.
In this section, we focus on personalizing the trust distance D T to avoid private data leakage in a single cloud. The objective is to design a differential privacy mechanism {A : D → δD n } that publishes the sensitive data d i from node n i to recipient node n j . The mechanism A generates n outcomeŝ y n ij that are then released to the cloud. Furthermore, A needs to meet the following constraints.
The first constraint is providing personalized privacy protection. For all the sensitive data d T ij , the generated n proxieŝ y n ij have to satisfy (d T ij )-differential privacy, where MAP() is a mapping function that maps trust distance d T ij to privacy level .
The second constraint is limiting the upper bound of personalized privacy levels after composition. For all the proxieŝ y n ij , the ceiling of all composition mechanisms should equal the maximum (d T ij ), rather than the sum of all (d T ij ).
where the superscript DP denotes differential privacy. The third constraint is to obtain the maximum utility under the personalized privacy scenario. For all the noisy responseŝ y n ij , they should denote the most accurate outputs of the raw data d ij . The least noisy response results in the maximum data utility. In terms of numeric value, the data utility is usually measured by the root-mean-square error. Thus, the minimum root-mean-square error results in the maximum data utility.
In the proposed personalized privacy protection model, there are various noisy outputsŷ n ij , and therefore, there are multiple corresponding data utility values. In this work, we specifically refer to the sum of data utility values when considering the maximum data utility in Equation 6 .
D. PRIVACY PROTECTION IN MULTIPLE CLOUDS
In addition to the features of the sensitive data itself, the data may also be released to multiple clouds from the fog server. The privacy challenges have long been discussed by earlier studies. In this subsection, we try to solve the personalized privacy protection problem in the multiple-cloud scenario. For instance, when the TV station asks for a TV series, the fog server will pass the query to a certain cloud server n Cj . However, after a few episodes, the fog server may observe that this cloud has stopped storing the TV series, or lacks a few episodes. In this case, the fog server has to send the query to other clouds to obtain assistance. In this way, the sensitive data are released to multiple clouds, and privacy protection is necessary. The fog server publishes node n i 's sensitive data k ∈ K times, where K denotes the number of clouds that receive the same data. The personalized privacy level is represented by MAP(k). It is a mapping function that maps k to privacy level .
We consider a one-round relaxation example for clarity. The results can also be intuitively extended to multiple rounds.
Assume that there are two privacy levels (K ) and (K ), where (K ) > (K ). There is a mechanism A (K )→ (K ) :
that publishes the sensitive data to two different cloud servers. In the first cloud server, node n i publishes a proxyŷ K ij to cloud server n Cj . The proxyŷ 1 ij satisfies (K )differential privacy. In the next cloud server, the privacy level is relaxed to (K )-differential privacy. If clouds collude to steal the more accurate sensitive data, the proposed mechanism should satisfy
where (K ) is the privacy level of the second noisy response.
As the upper bound of the composition theorem indicates, we have
from which we can obtain (K ) < (K ). This result implies that the second proxy cannot relax the privacy level at all but must instead tighten the privacy level. This is a contradiction, especially if (K ) < (K )
1. The data utility degrades significantly, resulting in applications becoming impractical. The problem of personalized privacy-preserving data publishing in multiple clouds can be formulated as described below.
We propose a mechanism {A (1)→ (K ) : D → δŷ k } that is differentially private if the sensitive data are published in multiple clouds. The mechanism A generates multiple proxieŝ y k and releases them to k different clouds. With the increase of (K ), the outcomes become progressively more accurate. In this scenario, the mechanism A should further satisfy the following constraints.
The first constraint is providing personalized privacy protection. For all the sensitive data d T ij , the generated n proxieŝ y n ij have to satisfy (d T ij )-differential privacy, where MAP() is a mapping function that maps trust distance d T ij to privacy level . The second constraint is limiting the upper bound of personalized privacy levels after composition. For all the proxieŝ y n ij , the ceiling of all composition mechanisms should equal the maximum (d T ij ), rather than the sum of all (d T ij ).
where the superscript DP denotes differential privacy. The third constraint is to obtain the maximum utility under the personalized privacy scenario. For all the noisy responseŝ y n ij , they should denote the most accurate outputs of the raw data d ij . The least noisy response results in the maximum data utility. In terms of numeric values, data utility is usually measured by the root-mean-square error. Thus, minimizing the root-mean-square error results in the maximum data utility.
The last requirement is personalized privacy levels of data publishing in multiple clouds. For data release to multiple clouds, the privacy levels { (1), (2), . . . , (K )} increase monotonically, which can be described by (1) < (2) < . . . < (K )}.
E. GENERIC PERSONALIZED PRIVACY SCHEME FOR A SMART HOME
In the above subsections, we analyze two types of personalized privacy protection application scenarios. The results show that personalized differential privacy is necessary, especially in a fog server. As the computing power of a fog server is limited, the privacy budget provided is also limited and fixed in a relevant small range.
For the trust distance problem and the multiple-cloud problem, we observe that both involve the same challenge, i.e., personalized privacy level functions (). Therefore, they are the same problem in a certain sense. Building on this, we formulate the problem of trust distance-based personalized privacy data diffusion over multiple clouds as follows.
Our target is to design a differentially private mechanism
} that publishes the sensitive data from node n i to cloud server n Cj through the fog server in a smart home. The mechanism generates n × k noisy proxies that are published to k cloud servers. The privacy level (d T ij , k) increases with incremented k, and the noisy proxies become progressively more accurate. The privacy level (d T ij , k) decreases as d T ij increases, and the proxies become progressively more noisy. Additionally, the mechanism A needs to satisfy the following constraints.
• Multiple-cloud data release: For a data release to multiple clouds with a fixed distance d T ij , the privacy levels
. • Personalized privacy protection: For all the sensitive data d ij , each proxyŷ T ij should satisfy (d T (ij), k)differential privacy.
• Limited upper bound of composition: For all the noisy proxies y k ij , the ceiling after composition should be the maximum ( 1 d ij , t), rather than the sum of ( 1 d ij , t). The mathematical description is provided by
• Maximum data utility: All the proxies y T ij have to be the most accurate noisy responses of actual outputs d ij , which results in the maximum utility. In the numeric data sense, data utility is measured by the root-mean-square error, as shown in Equation 11 . Furthermore, the minimum root-mean-square error leads to the maximum data utility.
V. COLLUSION ATTACK UNDER DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
After analyzing the two personalized privacy protection scenarios, we observe that adversaries can launch collusion attacks that impact the protection's effectiveness. Under the personalized differential privacy protection scenario, adversary and collusion attacks have certain new features and can be formulated mathematically under differential privacy. We model the adversary in the differential privacy sense in this work. In most existing approaches, the adversary is considered qualitatively, rather than quantitatively. Furthermore, the attack cannot be formulated based on the adversary. The result is that we can only measure the relative attack impact, e.g., via the information theory-based entropy. Therefore, we propose the differential privacy-based adversary model as follows.
In the proposed personalized differential privacy model, the privacy levels are modeled by (·). Therefore, we model the adversary by
where the background knowledge of the adversary can be regarded as complying with ad -differential privacy.
The advantage of modeling the adversary in this way is that we can use the composition theorem to include the impact of the adversary in the privacy protection model. In addition, the collusion attack can be further analyzed based on this definition.
A collusion attack is widely known as the scenario of two or more adversaries colluding with each other to obtain more accurate data. In our case, two or more clouds may share their data to perform a collusion attack and cause a leakage of private data. There are three conditions for launching a collusion attack. First, the sensitive data have been published on two or more clouds. Second, each of the clouds already possesses some data, and the clouds share the same interest. Third, the clouds have the incentive that they can obtain more information after colluding.
Building upon the adversary model, we can further develop the collusion attack definition.
Given m ∈ M adversaries (cloud servers) and their corresponding privacy levels d T , k M , the collusion attack can be described by
where CA(·) is the sum of all privacy levels ( s). As discussed above, the increase of the privacy level leads to a degradation of privacy protection. As the composition theorem is a built-in feature of differential privacy, collusion attacks can always be launched without proper operation.
VI. APDP MODEL
In our proposed smart home model, the privacy protection is guaranteed by differential privacy with Laplace noise. However, the existence of composition features of differential privacy may result in degradation of privacy protection. Therefore, we introduce the APDP model that uses a modified Laplace mechanism, in which the noise generation is integrated with the Markov process. As a result, the correlations among noises are broken, and hence, our APDP model is able to resist the collusion attack.
A. COMPOSITION MECHANISM UNDERLYING APDP
APDP is created to incorporate various mechanisms to provide privacy protection. In addition to the Laplace mechanism, other mechanisms include the exponential mechanism, the Gaussian mechanism, sampling, etc. Assume that mechanisms {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n } : D → (Y ) respectively satisfy { 1 , 2 , . . . , n }-differential privacy. The composition mechanism A : D → (Y n ) defined by A = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n } is called n i i -differentially private.
The respective privacy level n i i denotes the upper bound of the composition theorem. However, n i i overstates the actual privacy level. In this paper, we introduce APDP to explore correlations among mechanisms that ensure better privacy protection.
B. INCORPORATING A MARKOV PROCESS
I have modified the section to highlight APDP; please change accordingly to suit the change.
For n-dimensional numeric data d, our target is to propose a smart home-suitable mechanism A inside APDP to generate the noisy outputsŷ K ij that are sent by smart home node n i to cloud server n j and published in K cloud servers. A must have two features. First, the accuracy ||ŷ K ij − d K ij || should solely depend on the trust distance d T and the number of multiple cloud servers k, while all the other responses do not degrade the accuracy. Second, any group of cloud servers has no ability to infer more sensitive information about smart home node n i after collusion (d T , k). Motivated by this, we introduce a Markov process inside APDP that is defined over a continuous domain. This Markov transfer process will be further applied to fulfill the privacy-preserving mechanism in the following study.
Definition 2 (Markov Process): Given the privacy level and three specific privacy levels i−1 , i , and i+1 , where i−1 < i < i+1 , the Markov process has the following properties.
• The noise follows the Laplace distribution:
• The noise generation process is a Markov process:
where B is the Bessel function. We need the Markov process to guarantee that the correlations between noises are properly decoupled. Therefore, the proposed APDP model is able to resist the collusion attack.
C. APDP ANALYSIS
The Laplace mechanism is a popular approach to satisfying -differential privacy requirements. However, it cannot be optimal in terms of the minimum mean-square error. Therefore, in APDP, we target achieving the optimum Laplace mechanism for both minimum entropy and minimum mean-square error by designing the noise properly. (You need to play down the tone of the mechanism while highlighting APDP, which has a built-in mechanism and is customizable and configurable.) Theorem 1 (Optimum Laplace Mechanism): Given the -differentially private mechanism A : R n → (R n ), A satisfies y K ij = d ij + N , where N ∼ ρ(N ) ∈ (R n ). The mean-square error can be minimized if the noise density f satisfies
where f n 1 (v) denotes the density of noise at v. Thus, we have E y t ij − d ij
The optimum Laplace mechanism provides the solution to achieving optimized data utility at a fixed privacy level. We further prove that the proposed method can satisfy the optimum Laplace mechanism, which makes the proposed model more feasible and practical.
First, a one-dimensional case is considered for clarity. It can be further extended to multiple dimensions. In the following proposed theorem, we establish a method that satisfies all the requirements and illustrates the feasibility and effectiveness. 1 d ij , t and 2 1
d ij , t , are given. Then, the form of the mechanism is
Moreover, the density f
Based on the theorem, we can conclude that Theorem 2 has the following properties:
• The mechanism A 1 is 1 d T , k -differentially private. • The mechanism A 1 is optimal. Namely, A 1 minimizes the mean-square error E(V 1 ) 2 .
• The mechanism A 2 is 2 d T , k -differentially private.
• The mechanism A 2 is optimal. Namely, A 2 minimizes the mean-square error E(V 2 ) 2 .
• The mechanism (A 1 , A 2 ) is 2 d T , k -differentially private. The rationale for the noise following a Markov stochastic process is that a Markov process requires that the current state be only related to the preceding state. This implies that the current state is not impacted by the other states before the preceding state. In this case, the current noise is only determined by the preceding noise. In the proposed model, the privacy level increases with the trust distance, as does the noise. Therefore, the current user has no incentive to collude with the next user who has an inaccurate output with a greater noise.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this part, we demonstrate the performance of the proposed model in terms of privacy protection and data utility and compare the proposal to the ordinary personalized differential privacy that only personalizes the privacy levels but does not consider resistance to attacks. We also show that our proposal can outperform the existing approaches from the perspective of background knowledge attack. As a result, the experimental results based on real-world datasets show that our proposed model can minimize the overall privacy budget and maximize the data utility while eliminating the background knowledge attack.
We use a real-world smart home dataset that is collected in [48] , [49] and is based on a health-related smart home. The data are collected under 7 scenarios, including sleeping, resting, dressing, eating, toilet use, hygiene and communication. Fifteen candidates are contained in this dataset. Specifically, the shortest path is denoted by the hop account that captures the features of our model. However, our model can accommodate any type of distance metric used in existing approaches. The algorithms are implemented in MATLAB 2015 and run on a Mac OS platform with a Core i5 CPU running at 2.7 GHz with 8 GB of RAM.
In the comparison experiments, we compare the proposed attack-proof personalized differential privacy model (APDP) with uniform differential privacy (UDP) [17] and ordinary or normal personalized differential privacy (NPDP) [45] . First, UDP provides uniform privacy levels to all nodes. Second, NPDP provides different privacy levels based on various requirements. Third, APDP offers attack-proof personalized privacy levels built upon NPDP. We demonstrate the evaluation results below.
A. PRIVACY PROTECTION
As Fig. 3a shows, we use 1 to 6 nodes to simulate the composition mechanism. We can conclude that the proposed APDP has the best performance in term of privacy protection. With the increase of the node quantity, the privacy level of UDP does not increase and remains stable. The privacy levels of both NPDP and APDP increase due to the impact of the composition mechanism. Comparing these two models, we observe that APDP increases quickly and that the privacy levels release fast. The privacy issues are quite severe. However, APDP performs better, as it increases slowly, and the maximum values equals that of UDP. Therefore, APDP can minimize the negative impact of the composition mechanism and provide better privacy protection from the perspective of both strictness and customization.
In Fig. 3b , we illustrate the case of multiple clouds instead of multiple nodes. Similarly, we use 6 clouds as an example. In the case of multiple clouds, all the clouds are independent, and there is no co-relation inside them. Therefore, the composition theorem has a more significant impact on privacy protection. All three models suffer from performance degradation with the increase in the number of clouds. We can conclude that the privacy level of UDP increases the fastest, followed by NPDP. Only the privacy level of APDP increases moderately, and the maximum privacy level is still satisfactory.
In summary, APDP has the best privacy protection compared to UDP and NPDP under the scenarios of both multiple nodes and multiple clouds. 
B. DATA UTILITY
In the case of data utility, we reach the following conclusions based on Fig. 4 . The vertical axis denotes the amount of injected noise. Therefore, the smaller the noise is, the higher the data utility. The trends show that the data utility of UDP maintains the same level and remains the highest regardless of the number of multiple clouds. As for NPDP and APDP, the utilities of both approaches increase with the number of multiple clouds. However, compared to NPDP, APDP rises faster, i.e., it provides a higher data utility. In addition, the more clouds there are, the higher the data utility.
C. DEFENSE AGAINST A COLLUSION ATTACK
In Fig. 5a , we illustrate the performance of the three models against a collusion attack in multiple clouds. In this case, there are two attacks, which are represented by two green dashed lines. We demonstrate that UDP cannot prevent a collusion attack, while NPDP and APDP have the ability to defeat the attack to different degrees. NPDP can resist an attack to a certain degree; however, it ultimately fails as the green dashed line has an intersection with the red line. However, APDP is fully attack-proof, as the yellow line is consistently under the green dashed line.
In Fig. 5b , we illustrate the performance of the three models against a collusion attack with multiple nodes. Similar to the above, there are two attacks, which are represented by two green dashed lines. We demonstrate that UDP can prevent a collusion attack because the privacy level is not released after composition. NPDP and APDP have the ability to defeat the attack to different degrees. NPDP can resist the attack to a certain degree; however, it ultimately fails as the green dashed line has an intersection with the red line. APDP is fully attack-proof, as the yellow line is consistently under the green dashed line.
To summarize, APDP has the best performance in terms of collusion attack resistance. It can eliminate the collusion attack due to the properly decoupled noise generated by the modified Laplace mechanism.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first identify the performance and privacy challenges in smart homes; low bandwidth, high latency, and leakage of private data significantly impact the application of smart homes. To address these issues, a fog-based smart home system has been developed that can improve the performance with enhanced bandwidth and reduced service latency. We have also developed a personalized privacy protection model based on differential privacy. The proposed model can defeat the collusion attack under the scenario of multiple parties. Lastly, we have validated our proposal using trace-driven experiments. The evaluation results have shown that the proposed model can achieve optimized trade-off between privacy protection and data utility. In term of future work, we plan to leverage cross-discipline techniques to further optimize the trade-off, for example, Markov decision process and generative adversarial networks. In addition, we prepare to use other personalization matrix to extend this model to more generalized scenarios.
APPENDIX

PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof of Theorem 2. The noise of APDP model M = (M 1 , M 2 ) is defined by Equation 18. According to this, we prove that the proposed mechanism satisfies all the required properties.
1) The first coordinate is Laplace-distributed with parameter 1 1 . If x > 0, we can derive Equation 19 .
If x < 0, the equation follows the symmetry (x, y) → (−x, −y). Thus, we can conclude that M 1 is 1 -differentially private and obtains the best data utility.
2) The second coordinate is Laplace-distributed with parameter 1 2 . We can derive Equation 20 .
Therefore, we prove that M 2 is 2 -differentially private and obtains the best data utility.
3) Finally, we still need to prove that the composition mechanism maintains 2 -differential privacy. The delta part is handled separately by defining L = {x : (x, x) ∈ }. The probability of landing in is represented by
We compute a derivative and use Fubini's theorem to exchange the derivative with the integral, as shown in Equation 22.
d du
Pr(M ∈ S)
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